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JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDING^ BELOW 
This case involves an appeal* from a final determina-
tion of the jury that the negligence of the defendant was not 
a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. That determin-
ation was reached after a five-day trial. 
Defendants accept the plaintiff's statement on appel-
late jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants accept the statement c}f the case given by 
the plaintiff. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Defendants accept the plaintiff's statement of issues 
presented for review. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACT$ 
Ralph Ostler was a passenger riding with his father. 
Stephen Ostler, on 1-15 between Santaquin and Payson. Utah 
(R.2719:12-20. 2088:18-21). Mr. Wheeler stopped his truck 
with the truck's left-hand side 4'8" to the right of the solid 
white line, fully out of the travel lanes of the freeway 
(R.2116-2117) . The left-hand side of the vehicle was on the 
paved shoulder of the road, and the right-hand side of the 
vehicle was on the graveled shoulder (R.2118-2121). 
The accident occurred at approximately 3:00 a.m.. 
Utah time (R.2086). Mr. Wheeler got out of his truck, checked 
for air leaks and tire problems, relieved himself, got back 
in, and marked his log. He had been there approximately three 
minutes. (R. 2156:18-22) As he was preparing to move back 
onto the highway, he observed lights *in his rearview mirror, 
and was struck from the rear by a vehicle driven by Stephen 
Ostler (R.2158-2159). 
Ralph Ostler sustained injuries causing lower para-
plegia as a result of the accident. 
This suit was brought by Ralph Ostler for damages 
against the driver. Wheeler; his employer. Albina Transfer 
Co.. Inc.; and the owner of the truck. F & R Roe. Inc. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The fourteen subparts of plaintiff's Point I on ex-
clusion of evidence were each carefully considered by the 
trial court and correctly ruled upon. The trial court applied 
Rules 608. 403. 401. 702 and 703 of the Rules of Evidence in 
accordance with the prior decisions of the Utah appellate 
courts. 
Point II 
The trial court properly excluded improper examina-
tion of defendant Wheeler into matters that were no longer 
relevant to the issues of negligence and were improper at-
tempts at challenging credibility, in violation of the Rules 
of Evidence. 
-2-
Point III 
The trial court properly excluded admissibility of 
alleged prior bad acts, in accordance with Rule 608 of the 
Rules of Evidence. 
Point IV 
Defense counsel's closing argument was fair comment 
on the instructions given by the court and the evidence which 
had been presented. 
Point V 
The suit was brought against the defendants, and the 
instructions of the court informed the jury that if they re-
turned a verdict, it would be against all the defendants. 
Defense counsel's closing arguments were fair comment on the 
instructions and the evidence. 
Point VI 
There was no basis in the record for allowance of 
amendment for punitive damages. In any event, had the evi-
dence been produced to support a verdict on punitive damages, 
the amendment was unnecessary. 
Point VII 
Even though the court had already given a directed 
verdict that defendant Wheeler was negligent, the court never-
theless allowed an instruction to go to the jury to allow 
their determination of whether Wheeler was further negligent 
in failing to place flares and triangles, even though he was 
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stopped only three minutes. The instruction was a correct 
statement of the law pertaining to the federal regulations 
cited by the plaintiff. 
Point VIII 
The trial court allowed all appropriate voir dire 
examination of the jury requested by the plaintiff. The trial 
court only declined to interrogate the prospective jurors on 
matters which were improper voir dire. 
Point IX 
The trial court had previously viewed the videotape 
demonstration and concluded that it was not a recreation of 
the accident, but a supposition and conjectural presentation 
not borne out by the circumstances or facts. 
Point X 
The trial court's Instructions No. 25 and 27 on fore-
seeability. proximate cause, and superseding or intervening 
cause were in accordance with the decisions of the Utah Su-
preme Court. 
Point XI 
The issue of proximate cause of the negligence of 
Wheeler was properly submitted to the jury as a factual issue 
for their determination. Directed verdict on causation was 
not warranted. 
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POINT I 
The Trial Court Properly Considered All Prof-
ferred Evidence Regarding Proximate Cause. 
A. Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Moth Phenomenon. 
While the Court allowed the in camera testimony of 
plaintiff's experts Slade Hulbert and William Hewitt, no foun-
dation was provided to meet the criteria of Rule 702. Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
Dr. Hulbert testified that he had written "a little 
bit" about highway hypnosis, but said. "I don't fully under-
stand what goes on there." (R.2294:1-4) He also testified 
about a phenomenon he characterized as "the lure effect" or 
"moth phenomenon", but indicated that in his voluminous writ-
ings on highway safety, he had never written about such a 
phenomenon (R. 2218:5-14). He also said that he did not know 
if other researchers had done so (R.2220:12-25). 
Dr. Hulbert was asked. "What factors do you have to 
have present to have this luring effect contribute to an acci-
dent?" to which he responded: 
Well, no one is quite clear in detail on this 
phenomenon, but as best I can understand it. 
it can occur such a luring or misperception 
that the path he's supposed to be following 
is directly behind the flashing lights .... 
(R.2218:21-25. 2219:1-16). 
Dr. Hulbert was asked what differentiated between 
being asleep and being in a low state of arousal. He stated 
that the only way of determining t.hp rH ff Ar^nr** UA<? vnnwnnrr 
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whether the eyes were open or closed, or by studying brain-
waves. Dr. Hulbert further admitted that he had no way of 
knowing whether Stephen Ostler's eyes were open or closed, and 
had no way to study his brainwaves, and would have been unable 
to do so even if the driver had survived. (R.2221:6-20 - See 
Excerpt No. 1. Addendum.) 
Appellant postulates that this testimony was prof-
fered to establish that the Ostler driver was not asleep, but 
was in a reduced state of alertness. That testimony was not 
admitted because of a lack of foundation and competency. 
In excluding that testimony, the trial judge said: 
I have heard nothing to indicate any basis 
for a determination on his part that there 
was a man that was either, that was not 
asleep, or that he was merely somewhere im-
paired in his appreciation of the things 
around him .... and I do think it may be 
prejudicial to have an opinion that's based 
on nothing more than likelihood or a possi-
bility, pure speculation. 
(R.2226:15-19. 24-25). 
There is nothing that's been shown or indi-
cated that is consistent with being asleep 
any less than being with, consistent with 
being inattentive. 
(R.2227:1-5). 
Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon 
which an expert bases an opinion or inference 
may be those perceived by or made known to 
him at or before the hearing. If of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field in forming opinions or in-
ferences upon the subject, the facts or data 
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need not be admissible in evidence, (emphasis 
added) 
As discussed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia in Merit Motors, Inc.. v. Chrysler Corp.. 
569 F.2d 666 (1977) in applying Rule 703 $f the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, which is identical to Rule 
Evidence: 
703. Utah Rules of 
Even Rule 703 requires that the grounds re-
lied on by an expert must be a "feype reason-
ably relied upon by experts in the particu-
lar field in forming opinions ojf inferences 
upon the subject. 
Merit at 673. 
See also the recent case of Craig Food Industries. 
Inc., v. Weihinq. 71 UAR 46. 746 P.2d 279 (1987). 
A trial court has considerable discretion in 
determining whether expert testimony is ad-
missible. Dixon v. Stewart. 65^ P.2d 592. 
597 (Utah 1982) . 
Furthermore, it is within the ttfial court's 
discretion in determining whether the "expert 
is qualified to give an opinion on a specific 
matter. Wessell v. Erickson Landscaping Co.. 
711 P.2d 250. 253 (Utah 1985). 
Even assuming that the "lure ef fecit" or "moth phenom-
enon" had intellectual validity and was accepted in the field. 
Dr. Hulbert does not have sufficient data to reach a conclu-
sion that the phenomenon contributed to thi^ accident. 
In discussing the facts upon whidh he based his an-
alysis and his application of the analysis. Dr. Hulbert was 
asked what factors have to be present to have the "lure ef-
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feet" contribute to an accident. (R.2218:21-23). Dr. Hulbert 
said. "Well, no one is quite clear on this phenomenon, but as 
best I can understand it..." and then gave a long list of 
factors required to trigger the phenomenon. (R.2219:1-16). 
Dr. Hulbert was then asked. 
Q: Okay. Did you find any. in your analysis 
of this accident, did you find any of those 
factors present? 
A: I don't have any evidence that any of 
those factors were present. No. I don't. 
(R.2219:17-20). 
In Fisher v. Trapp. 73 UAR 105. 748 P.2d (1988). the 
Court of Appeals reaffirmed: 
The trial court's determination of adequate 
foundation is solely within the discretion of 
the trial court. Tias v. Proctor. 591 P.2d 
438. 440 (Utah 1979); see also Craig Food 
Indus, v. Weihinq. [supra]. 
The Court further said: 
Further. "[t]he admissibility of accident 
reconstruction evidence depends in large 
measure upon the foundation laid. The exper-
tise of the witness, his degree of familiari-
ty with the necessary facts, and the logical 
nexus between his opinion and the facts ad-
duced must be established." Edwards v. Did-
ericksen. 597 P.2d 1328. 1331 (Utah 1979). 
The basis of defendants' contention that the "moth 
effect" testimony is inadmissible is set forth fully in defen-
dants' Motions in Limine (R.1557-1584. 1531-1556). The 
court's ruling after hearing plaintiff's experts in camera was 
that an adequate foundation had not been laid. The granting 
of defendants' motions in limine was correct. 
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B. Exclusion of Evidence that Father Ostler Was 
Awake. 
The issue on whether or not Stephen Ostler was awake 
was supposedly based on the testimony of the defendant driver. 
Wheeler, who was asked what he saw when the lights of the 
vehicle approached from the rear. He said he thought it was 
like the vehicle was changing lanes, ahd that the driver 
thought he was pulling in behind him. Plaintiff's experts 
attempted to use Wheeler's conjecture as to what was in the 
mind of the driver to demonstrate that the driver was not 
asleep. 
As was set out in Point A above. Dr. Hulbert was 
asked how he could differentiate between sleep and a low state 
of arousal, and how he could determine whether the Ostler 
driver was asleep or merely drowsy. He was unable to do so. 
After listening to plaintiff's testimony, the trial 
judge stated: 
THE COURT: Counsel. I don't have any ques-
tion the expertise of the doctor in several 
fields. But I'm not persuaded that in this 
case the testimony is going to be helpful to 
the Jury. I've heard nothing to indicate any 
basis for a determination on hift part that 
there was a man that was either, that was not 
asleep, or that he was merely qomewhat im-
paired in his appreciation of the things 
around him. 
It seems to me that that's something that the 
jury can. just as well as anyone else, can 
infer and can determine from their own exper-
ience in this type of a circumstance, and 
that it can be argued by counsejL. I don't 
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see that it's going to be helpful from that 
standpoint. And I do think it may be preju-
dicial to have an opinion that's based on 
nothing more than likelihood or a possibili-
ty, pure speculatin. 
The facts are that the man ran off and hit 
into the back of the truck. There is nothing 
that's been shown or indicated that that is 
consisten with being asleep, any less than 
being with, consistent with being inattentive. 
So that the Court is going to sustain the 
objection to the testimony of the doctor on 
that basis. (emphasis added). 
(R.2226:12-25. 2227:1-7). 
The court sustained defendants' objections to Dr. 
Hulbert's testimony. 
Plaintiff's conclusion that a shallow angle of impact 
indicates the driver was awake is without expert testimony and 
without foundation. Dr. Hulbert did not claim to be an acci-
dent reconstructionist. but said he was a "human factors re-
search scientist." (R.2187:7-8). Mr. Hewitt testified that 
he was a "transportation consultant". (R.2250:16-17) He 
claimed he had been gualified as an accident reconstructionist 
from the late 1960's until 1982. but then elected, because of 
the voluminous material coming out under both reconstruction 
and motor carriers, to separate these two and to maintain his 
expertise as a consultant of compliance with motor vehicle 
regulations. 
The suggestion that Stephen Ostler was not tired at 
the previous road stop ignores the fact that that stop was 
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north of Cedar City in the Beaver area, far removed from the 
time and place of the accident. No qualified accident recon-
structionist could use that statement to determine that Ste-
phen Ostler was not asleep at the time of the accident. 
Plaintiff further suggests that had Stephen Ostler 
been asleep he would have run straight off the road at a curve 
in the roadway prior to the accident sdene. That argument 
ignores the fact that the driver did leave the road beyond the 
curve. Whenever the driver fell asleep, it was apparently 
shortly before leaving the travel lane. 
Plaintiff further claimed that a sleeping driver 
would relax to such extent that he would hot keep his foot on 
the gas pedal, and his vehicle would slow considerably before 
drifting off the road. In fact, the plaintiff's accident 
reconstructionist testified that the Ostler vehicle was trav-
eling at 48 mph in a 55 mph zone, demonstrating that the 
driver may have relaxed prior to impact. Such confirms that 
he was probably asleep. 
The claim that the Ostler driver} was not asleep is 
pure speculation, unsupported by competent evidence and testi-
mony. The court's determination was that there was insuffi-
cient foundation for admission of plaintiff's expert testi-
mony, or for a conclusion to be made by anyone that the Ostler 
driver was not asleep. 
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The citations in plaintiff's brief on relevancy are 
inapplicable, since the exclusion of the evidence as to the 
sleeping driver was predicated upon 'lack of foundation and 
expertise, not on relevancy. The citation to Huddleston v. 
United States. 485 U.S. ; 108 S.Ct. 1496; 99 L.Ed. 2nd 
771 (1988). merely confirms that the trial judge acted appro-
priately in determining that the evidence was not supported by 
adequate foundation. His decision was in complete harmony 
with the citations given by plaintiff. 
C. Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Violation of 
Federal Regulations. 
Plaintiff submitted a pretrial motion for partial 
summary judgment on the issue of negligence. He asserted that 
alleged violation of ICC driving time regulations was a basis 
for granting his motion. Defendants filed a countermotion for 
partial summary judgment. (R.1088-89) with a memorandum 
(R.1090-1098). Plaintiff replied to defendants1 motion 
(R.1205-1213). The trial court granted defendants1 motion for 
partial summary judgment, saying: 
The Court is of the opinion, conceding for 
the sake of argument that such driving time 
regulations were violated. that any such 
violation would be entirely irrelevant to 
Plaintiff's claims of negligence in this 
case. Provided, that should Defendants pre-
sent evidence at trial in support of a de-
fense that Defendant acted as a result of an 
emergency or justification in parking, then 
it may be appropriate for Plaintiff to pre-
sent evidence of any such violation of ICC 
-12-
Driving Time Regulations in rebuttal of such 
a defense, (emphasis added) (R.12^4-1245) 
It is inappropriate to argue thaj: any alleged viola-
tion of driving time regulations had any connection with this 
accident. The regulations are designed t<> limit driving time 
so that operaters of motor carriers will remain alert while in 
actual operation of the vehicle. Mr. Wheeler was not driving 
at the time of the accident, but was stopped. Had Wheeler 
been driving for only one hour prior to stopping, it would not 
have prevented the accident. The amount of time Wheeler oper-
ated his vehicle has no significance in this case. 
The court complied exactly with the mandate pro-
nounced in Pierce v. Wisstesen. 701 P.2d 489 (Utah 1985) and 
balanced the probative value against countervailing factors. 
The court concluded that the evidence should not be admitted. 
In so ruling, the court locked the defendants in to not pre-
senting evidence as to emergency or justification on the con-
dition that if they put in evidence on justification, he might 
admit the driving logs with the alleged violations prejudicial 
to the defendants. 
Despite the ruling, plaintiff's counsel attempted to 
put in evidence of alleged violation of driving time regula-
tions (R.1978). The court reiterated its ruling, saying that 
if justification or emergency were raised, then the court 
would reconsider the matter. Defense counsel committed to the 
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court that no such evidence would be presented (T.1979:16-18). 
and it was not. 
The court instructed the jury that Wheeler's negli-
gence had been ruled on as a matter of law at the request of 
plaintiff's counsel, and that Wheeler was negligent in parking 
the vehicle where he did (T.2152:7-16). 
In Pierce v. Wisstesen, supra, where the issue was 
the admissibility of the illegal purchase and consumption of 
alcoholic beverages two days prior to the accident, the Court 
said: 
If evidence has some probative value, but has 
a tendency to unduly prejudice or confuse the 
issues or to mislead the jury, the trial 
court must balance the probative value 
against those countervailing factors to de-
termine whether the evidence should be admit-
ted, (emphasis added) 
at 482. 
There is no causal link between the alleged violation 
of driving time regulations and the plaintiff's injuries. 
Defendant was not driving at the time of the accident, and any 
hazard created by the defendant in parking was not due to the 
alleged violation of driving time regulations. 
The statute was intended to avoid the risk of expos-
ing other drivers to one whose driving ability was impaired 
due to his violation of the regulation, not to avoid the risk 
of someone negligently crashing into the driver's vehicle 
while he was stopped. 
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Having found as a matter of law that defendant 
Wheeler was negligent and that defendants would not put in 
evidence as to justification, the issue was moot. Plaintiff's 
claim that the court erred in excluding evidence of the viola-
tion of the driving time regulations is without merit. 
D. Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Purpose of the 
Emergency Lanes. 
The in camera testimony of Slade Hulbert included a 
general statement as to the paved shoulder being for the pur-
pose of accomodating disabled or errant vehicles. The testi-
mony was given in connection with a claim of foreseeability. 
In view of the court's previous ruling that parking a vehicle 
on the shoulder was negligence as a matteif of law. any testi-
mony of the purpose of the lane was immaterial and irrelevant. 
Plaintiff's contention that the exclusion of such evidence was 
error is without merit. 
E. Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Foreseeability 
(Road Designers). 
During Dr. Hulbert's testimony, while the court con-
sidered defendants' motion in limine. plaintiff's counsel 
queried Mr. Hulbert as to the foreseeability of vehicles 
straying onto the shoulder. The court allowed that testimony 
to the effect that such circumstance was foreseeable. Then 
the court inquired of the witness. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hulbert. do you have to be an 
expert to know that? 
-15-
THE WITNESS: No. You don't. You don't. 
It's just that it is foreseeable. I would 
say it's common knowledge that that occurs. 
(R.2206:15-19) 
Based on the witness' testimony that his opinion was 
not helpful to the jury because they could make this analysis 
as readily as Dr. Hulbert could, the court excluded evidence 
on foreseeability by the claimed expert. 
The plaintiff's contention that the court erred in 
excluding such testimony is without merit. 
F. Exclusion of Evidence of Foreseeability (Truck 
Drivers) 
Plaintiff's counsel asked Mr. Hewitt, his ostensible 
expert, for an opinion on whether truckers would find a colli-
sion with a parked vehicle foreseeable, based upon his semi-
nars with truckers and the "common talk" he heard when truck-
ers talk to each other. Hewitt replied that such talk was a 
common subject "at least since 1982." (R.2267:1-7, 14-22 -
See Excerpt No. 2, Addendum.) 
The mere fact that a subject may have been brought up 
during seminars, or that it should be foreseeable to a truck 
driver, does not establish a foundation to show that it is 
expert opinion, since it is truckers who generally raise the 
question, or that such information is relied upon by experts. 
The fact that Hewitt may have provided a handout 
illustrating regulations on placement of warning devices does 
-16-
not establish foreseeability. Such devices, according to the 
regulations and Hewitt's testimony, are required to be placed 
only after a truck has been stopped fx>r at least ten minutes. 
that he had been 
testimony qualified 
No evidence negated Wheeler's testimony! 
parked only two or three minutes. No 
Hewitt to make such a claim. Nevertheless, the court gave 
Instruction No. 24 to the jury, that if Wneeler was parked for 
more than ten minutes, then he was in violation of the statute 
for not having placed flares or triangles. 
G. Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Test Results. 
Prior to trial, plaintiff filed a motion in limine 
l 
for a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of a videotape 
prepared under his direction. (R.906-915, 1027-1034). Defen-
dants responded with a memorandum opposing that motion and 
" .. . I 
making their own motion in limine, asking the court to bar the 
showing of the videotape. (R.968-976, 9^77-983). The court 
heard arguments and viewed the videotape on October 23, 1987. 
On October 27, 1988, the court denied plaintiff's motion in 
limine and granted defendants1 motion. (R.1197). 
This matter is fully discussed under Point IX, infra. 
H. Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Emergency Devices. 
After the so-called expert had been asked whether 
flares and triangles could have averted the accident, the 
court asked if only an expert could appreciate that. The 
expert admitted that no expertise was involved in understand-
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ing, accepting or appreciating it. and that human factors 
testimony was really only a good deal of common sense. 
(R.2214a:18-25. 2215:1) 
The expert's claim was also premised on the concept 
that if warning devices had been put out. the driver of the 
Ostler vehicle would have seen them. In fact, if the driver 
was asleep, he would not have seen them at all. Further, the 
so-called expert could not testify that the decedent was not 
asleep at the time of the accident. (R.2221:6-20) On that 
basis, he certainly could not suppose that had flares been put 
out. the driver would have seen them and avoided the accident. 
Thus, the testimony of the so-called expert on the impact of 
emergency devices was based on conjecture. Plaintiff's argu-
ment is without merit. 
I. The Excluded Evidence Was Not Admissible. 
Plaintiff contends that the admissibility of the 
evidence is controlled by Restatement (Second) of Torts. 447. 
While this writer does not contend that the Restatement of 
Torts differs from that contained in plaintiff's brief, the 
issues here are controlled by case law of the Courts of Ap-
peals of the State of Utah. The citation to the Restatement 
of Torts supports what was done in this case, wherein the 
court submitted its instructions to the jury on proximate 
cause, intervening cause, and sole proximate cause. The ap-
pellant suggests that the trial court did not comply with 
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comment on Clause C in the Restatement ofl Torts; however, it 
is this writer's contention that the very issue presented to 
the jury was whether or not the intetvening act was the sole 
proximate cause. 
In support of the issue of foresteeability, plaintiff 
cites Harris v. Utah Transit Authority. 671 P.2d 217 (1983). 
In that case, the bus was stopped with its rear end extending 
into the street. The court held that it ^as reasonably fore-
seeable that a momentarily inattentive driver might strike 
that bus in the lane of traffic. In the ctase now before this 
Court, the Albina truck was stopped 4,8M to the right of the 
solid line of 1-15. The jury was instructed that they must 
consider the foreseeability under those circumstances, and the 
jury decided against the plaintiff. They found that it was 
not foreseeable that someone would drive out of the lane of 
traffic and strike a parked truck with its flashing warning 
lights. The instructions given by the court as No. 25 (R.1671 
-1672). No. 26 (R.1673-1674) and No. 27 (R.1675-1676) correct-
ly reflect the reguirements mandated in Harris. 
This issue is more fully addressed in Point X. infra. 
J. Basis for the Trial Court!s Exclusion of Evidence. 
Prior to trial, defendants filed motions in limine 
I 
citing to the depositions of plaintiff's experts Hulbert and 
Hewitt. At the trial, the court allowed the plaintiff to take 
the testimony of his experts out of the hearing of the jury to 
-19-
lay a foundation for their testimony. At the conclusion of 
several hours of testimony, the court granted defendants' 
motions in limine for the reason that plaintiff had not estab-
lished a foundation to show either that his witnesses were 
experts or that their theories were accepted by other experts 
and accident reconstructionists. The court's exclusion of 
their testimony was fully documented in the record. 
K. Qualifications of Ralph Ostler's Expert (Hulbert). 
The resume of Mr. Hulbert is attached to the defen-
dants' motion in limine (R.1574-1584). That resume shows that 
Mr. Hulbert has written and done studies in many areas. None 
of those writings and studies are in the area on which he was 
being asked to testify. He testified that he had never writ-
ten on a "lure effect" or "moth phenomenon" (R.2218:5-14) and 
that he was not aware of any researchers who had written on 
that subject (R.2220:12-25). 
Despite Mr. Hulbert's obvious qualifications in some 
of the fields set forth in his resume, he was not qualified, 
nor did he have the foundation, to testify to those matters 
which plaintiff attempted to elicit from him. Thus, his tes-
timony was rejected by the court. 
L. Admissibility of the Excluded Evidence. 
Appellant suggests that "no one seriously contends 
that the excluded evidence was not relevant." One cannot tell 
what evidence appellant refers to, but certainly the defen-
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dants always contended that the driver's logs were not rele-
vant to the issues to be presented to the iury. The court so 
ruled. 
Defendants' contention was then, and is now, that the 
testimony of the so-called experts was not supported by ade-
quate foundation, nor was the testimony to be elicited from 
them of a nature generally accepted by experts in the field. 
The testimony was therefore novel, unsupported, lacked founda-
tion, and was inadmissible. 
Appellant assumes that the exclusion was predicated 
solely upon Rule 702, pertaining to whether or not the evi-
dence would assist the jury. However, defendants contend that 
it was foundationally deficient. In addition, the quotation 
of the trial judge's rulings demonstrate his conclusion that 
it would not assist the trier of fact, particularly in view of 
the "waffling" by both experts in their responses to specific 
questions about this accident. 
One of the crucial issues to be decided by the trial 
judge in determining whether to allow an expert to testify is 
whether the matter at issue is within the common knowledge and 
experience of the jury. As set forth in Day v. Lorenzo Smith 
and Sob, Inc.. 17 Utah 2d 221, 408 P.2d 186: 
Expert testimony is not admissable solely 
because the witness has some skill in a par-
ticular field, but is admissable, if at all, 
only because the witness can offer assistance 
on a matter not within the knowledge or com-
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mon experience of people of ordinary intelli-
gence. 
Id at 226. 
In Edwards v. Didericksen. supra, the Court reiterat-
ed Day, stating that "experts should only testify to opinions 
which laymen are not competent to reach". Jd.. at 1331. 
In Zimmer v. Miller Trucking Co.. Inc.. 743 F.2d 601 
(1984). the Eighth Ciruit Court of Appeals applied Rule 702. 
Federal Rules of Evidence. The trial court declined to allow 
a police officer to testify that illegal parking caused the 
accident, and held that Rule 702 only permits 
a qualified expert to testify in the form of 
an opinion if the witness* specialized know-
ledge will assist the jury to understand the 
evidence or decide a fact in issue. [Cita-
tions omitted] ...if the subject matter is 
within the knowledge or experience of layman, 
expert testimony is superfluous. 
Id at 604. 
As set forth in In re Air Crash Disaster at New Or-
leans. LA., 795 F.2d 1230 (5th Circuit. 1986): 
The trial judge ought to insist that a proper 
expert bring to the jury more than the law-
yers can offer in argument. Indeed. the 
premise of receiving expert opinion is that 
it will "assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue". 
Id. at 1233. 
Appellant's experts brought nothing to the jury's 
analysis. The jury was capable of drawing on their common 
experience and understanding to determine whether the parking 
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of the truck created a dangerous condition, or that the risk 
of an errant vehicle running into the ttuck was or was not 
foreseeable. 
The danger of allowing an expert to express an opin-
ion on a matter within the common experience and knowledge of 
the jury is that there is a high likelihood that the jury will 
allow the expert opinion to supplant the exercise of their own 
independant judgment. Scott v. Sears Roebuck & Co.. 789 F.2d 
1052 (4th Circuit. 1987). 
Dr. Hulbert was not gualified as an expert to render 
an opinion on the cause of the collision. Rule 702 allows an 
opinion by an expert only when his knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education qualifies him to render an opin-
ion. Dr. Hulbert has no training in physics or accident re-
construction. (R. 1574-1584) His training and experience is 
as a psychologist, more particularly as a consultant in human 
factors. He repeatedly testified that he was not a recon-
structionist and was not qualified by training or experience 
to reconstruct the cause of the accident. In fact, the basis 
upon which Dr. Hulbert reached his conclusion that the parking 
of the truck alongside the highway caused this collision is 
simply that if the truck had not been there, the crash would 
not have occurred. (R.1903. page 44:6-16) 
The infinite variety of fact circumstances and the 
creative testimony of consultants eager to hire themselves out 
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requires the judge to carefully determine what to allow to be 
presented to the jury. As discussed in In re Air Crash, supra: 
Our customary deference also 'assumes that the 
Trial Judge actually exercised his discre-
tion. In saying this, we recognized the 
temptation to answer objections to receipt of 
expert testimony with the shorthand remark 
that the jury will give it "the weight it 
deserves11. This nigh reflective explanation 
may be sound in some cases, but in others it 
can mask a failure by the Trial Judge to come 
to grips with an important trial decision. 
Trial judges must be sensitive to the quali-
fications of persons claiming to be experts. 
Because the universe of experts is defined 
only by the virtually infinite variety of 
fact questions in the trial courts, the sig-
nals of competence cannot be catalogued, 
(emphasis added) 
Id. at 1233. 1234. 
The Court went on to identify two important signals 
that the judge can look for in expert testimony: 
We know from our judicial experience that 
many such able persons present studies and 
express opinion that they might not be will-
ing to express in articles submitted to a 
refereed journal of their discipline or in 
other context subject to peer review. We 
think that is one important signal, along 
with many others, that ought to be considered 
in deciding whether to accept expert testi-
mony . 
Id. at 1234. 
As Dr. Hulbert testified, while he has published many 
writings on the subject of sleeping drivers he has never in-
cluded any mention of the "lure effect". 
See Merit Motors. Inc. v. Chrysler Corp.. supra, in 
applying Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
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Because of the lack of acceptance of this lure effect 
by experts in the field, the trial court refused to allow Dr. 
Hulbert to testify concerning it or his qonclusions resulting 
from its use. 
Dr. Hulbert further admitted that he could not know 
whether the Ostler driver was asleep, and thus could not know 
whether his lure effect applied. In Newman v. Hy-way Heat 
Systems, Inc., 789 F.2d, 269 (4th Circuit. 1986). the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, commenting on identical rules of 
evidence dealing with expert opinion as used in Utah, stated 
that 
It is fixed law that "an expert can give his 
opinion on the basis of hypothetical facts. 
but those facts must be established by inde-
pendent evidence properly introduced". [Cita-
tions omitted]... Nothing in the rules ap-
pears to have been intended to permit experts 
to speculate in fashions unsupported by, and 
in this case indeed in contradiction of, the 
uncontroverted evidence in this case. The 
expert opinion as to causation here consti-
tutes no more than such speculation, and the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
striking the same, (emphasis adde<^) 
The evidence was properly prohibited within the sound 
discretion of the trial judge. 
M. Standard of Review for Excluded Evidence. 
Defendants agree that the standard of review for the 
exclusion of expert testimony is within the trial court's 
considerable discretion. The rulings on admission of evidence 
are not overturned absent an abuse of that discretion. Defen-
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dants further agree with the quotation from In re Air Crash. 
supra, which says: 
In deciding whether explanation of an expert 
will assist the jury or judge, the superior 
position of the trial judge over the appel-
late judge is apparent. 
Id. at 1233. 
There is no showing in this case that there was any 
abuse of discretion by the trial judge. His exclusion of 
evidence was based on the lack of foundation and expertise for 
admissibility. 
N. Prejudice Because of Excluded Evidence. 
Appellants suggest that defendant Wheeler told his 
side of the story. The record shows that plaintiff called 
Wheeler as an adverse party three separate times. His respon-
ses were to questions asked by plaintiff's counsel. He was 
not called by the defense. If Wheeler told his side of the 
story, it was only because plaintiff's counsel brought out 
those facts in his case in chief. Plaintiff's counsel now 
complains about the information he elicited. 
The inadmissibility of the driving logs and their 
lack of relevance has been previously discussed. The sugges-
tion that the driver of the Ostler vehicle was not asleep but 
was in a reduced state of awareness is not borne out by the 
evidence. As such, no prejudice to plaintiff's case came as a 
result of the exclusion of such evidence. 
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POINT II 
The Trial Court Did Not Und\ily Restrict 
Ostler's Right to Cross-Examine Wheeler on 
the Issue of Searching for a Place to Stop, 
Appellant claims that it was reversible error to 
sustain the defendants1 objection to the question directed to 
Wheeler, "How long had you been looking for a place to stop 
and urinate before you actually stopped?" (R.2089:2-5)• The 
objection was based on the irrelevance and immateriality of 
the question. In a colloquy between the court and counsel, 
plaintiff's counsel asserted that if asked that question. 
Wheeler would answer as he had on deposition that he had £een 
looking for 30 minutes. Counsel then purported that he would 
submit Exhibit No. 4. a large aerial map showing a number of 
signs within the last several miles prilor to the point of 
stopping where he could have stopped (R.2069:22-25. 2090-2096). 
Defense counsel objected, since there are any number 
of reasons he would not use those exits on an unfamiliar road 
(R.2082). Plaintiff's attempt was to forcje defendants to show 
justification (R.2092:1-7). Since the court had ruled that 
defendants could not put on evidence to justify the stop with-
out opening the door for plaintiff's counsel to submit the 
driver's logs, then the question of how long Wheeler had 
looked for a place to stop was immaterial. At that point, the 
issues before the court were the negligence of Wheeler, proxi-
mate cause, and damages. 
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During that discussion, plaintiff's counsel again 
raised that issue. (R.2099) Plaintiff's counsel also renewed 
his motion for a directed verdict on tire issue of negligence. 
The court then indicated that if the defendants would 
not put on evidence to justify the stop, the ordinance prohib-
iting a stop would be sufficient to support a directed verdict 
on negligence. (R.2100:13-25. 2101:1-4. 2102:9-16. 19-25. 
2103:1-22) The court granted the plaintiff's motion for a 
directed verdict on negligence. (R.2104:21-25. 2105:1-6) 
Plaintiff indicated that that ruling shuffled part of 
his evidence, and he would skip to deal with proximate cause 
and damages, the only remaining factual issues (R.2105:16-25). 
The court informed the jury of its ruling on negli-
gence, and that the matter would be decided on the basis of 
proximate cause and damages. (R.2152:7-21) 
On appeal, plaintiff claims that the guestion about 
how long Wheeler had looked for a place to stop goes to 
Wheeler's truthfulness. However, plaintiff's counsel admits 
that he had placed in evidence the driver's logs, showing the 
accident time as 2:00 a.m. PST (Exhibit No. 3). and a state-
ment given to an investigator that Wheeler had pulled off the 
highway at 1:30 or 1:45 (Exhibits 19 and 20). Those items and 
the discrepancies in them so strongly urged by plaintiff were 
already in evidence. The court held that since Wheeler's 
deposition testimony was the same as his trial testimony. 
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there was no discrepancy for impeachment. The question of how 
long he had been looking for a place to stop could not be used 
to challenge his credibility. 
Counsel wanted to use the aerial 
witness. However, the tendancy of that t] 
an issue which the court had already ruled 
Under Rule 608(b). Utah Rules of 
map to impeach the 
estiraony was to open 
upon. 
Evidence, "specific 
instances of conduct of a witness for purpose of attacking or 
supporting his credibility...may not be 
evidence." Thus, the admission of the drl 
prohibited. The question as to how long Wheeler had looked 
for a place to stop, and the attempt to u 
part and parcel of the same idea. The triiil judge said. 
proved by extrinsic 
iver's logs would be 
se Exhibit No. 4. is 
timony is to 
has already 
I think the tendancy of that tes 
get into an issue that the court 
ruled as not being admissible iji this case. 
Mr. DeBry. You've got your Record. The 
court is going to sustain the objection. 
Rule 401 of the Rules of Evidence defines relevant 
evidence as that 
...having any tendency to make t}he existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action morel probable or 
less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. 
In this case, with the only regaining issues being 
proximate cause and damages, the question about which appel-
lant now complains would have no relevahcy. Negligence had 
been determined, and Wheeler's credibility could only go to 
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the issue of whether he was negligent in stopping or to im-
properly impugn his character. 
In addition, the intent to S*LOW Wheeler to be a liar 
could only be drawn from counsel's inuendo. and not by the 
evidence itself. 
In this area, the trial court's discretion is broad 
and has been reaffirmed on numerous occasions. Martin v. 
Safeway Stores. Inc. . 565 P.2d 1139 (1977). Only an abuse of 
discretion will overturn the judge's ruling on the examination 
of witnesses. Perkins v. Fit Well Artificial Limb. 514 P.2d 
811. 30 Ut. 2d 151 (1973). 
The question was properly excluded. 
POINT III 
The Trial Court Did Not Unduly Restrict 
Ostler's Right to Impeach Wheeler by Prior 
Bad Acts. 
Appellant contends that he should have been permitted 
to submit the driver's logs and Hewitt's testimony to illus-
trate a violation of the ICC regulations on driving time. He 
contends that these were offered as impeachment and that Rules 
404(b) and 608(b). Utah Rules of Evidence, allow their admis-
sion into evidence. He contends that those violations attack 
Wheeler's credibility by showing he had fraudulently filled 
out his logs. Appellant cites Huddleston v. United States, 
supra. He claims that the evidence proffered in Huddleston 
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was not to show Huddleston's prior bad atts to prove that he 
was a bad man. but to show knowledge 
In the instant case, the evidenc^ appellant claims as 
impeachment on credibility is specificallkr prohibited by Rule 
608(b). Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Specific instances of the conduct of a wit-
ness, for the purpose of attacking or sup-
porting his credibility, other than convic-
tion of crime as provided in Rjile 609. may 
not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They 
may, however, in the discretion i?£ the court, 
if probative of truthfulness oij untruthful-
ness, be inquired into on cross-examination 
of the witness (1) concerning his character 
for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) 
concerning the character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness of another witness as to which 
character the witness being cposs-examined 
has testified. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently spoken on that 
subject, in State v. Speer. 750 P.2d 186 (1988): 
The rebuttal testimony offered 
was in the form of specific 
conduct. supposedly offered to 
credibility of defendant. This 
contravention of the plain language of Rule 
608. 
in this case 
instances of 
attack the 
is in direct 
Such use of this evidence violates Rule 
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which 
states: 
(b) Evidence of other crirn^  
acts is not admissible to 
s. wrongs or 
prove the 
character of a person in o rder to show 
that he acted in conformity therewith. 
It may. however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of| motive, op-
portunity, intent. preparation. plan. 
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knowledge, identity, or absence of mis-
take or accident, (emphasis added) 
Appellant now suggests that his evidence would show 
motive. He misinterprets the rule. The rule is intended to 
allow the introduction of specific acts to show a motive for 
committing the act which is the wrong of which complaint is 
made. In this case, it was not so intended, but was to show, 
ostensibly, that Wheeler lied about his logs and that there-
fore he might lie about how long he had been parked. 
The Court is also cited to State v. DiAlo. 748 P.2d 
194 (1987) at 199. wherein the Court said: 
The marginal probative value of this evidence 
was overwhelmingly outweighed by the proba-
bility of unfair prejudice and confusion of 
the issues submitted to the jury and its 
admission clearly affected the substantial 
rights of the defendant. 
Had the trial judge in this case admitted the logs 
and a witness to interpret them, the marginal probative value 
of that evidence is overwhelmingly outweighed by the prejudice 
visited upon the defendants. It would have been a clear vio-
lation of Rule 608(b) to have allowed this extrinsic evidence. 
In addition, the trial court specifically exercised 
its prerogative under Rule 403. which provides that relevant 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues or misleading of the jury. That position is 
further demonstrated by State v. Miller. 709 P.2d 350 (1985): 
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Notwithstanding the relevance of evidence, 
however, the trial judge is within the scope 
of his discretion in excluding under the 
provisions of Rule 403 [quoting the rule]... 
As the Fourth Circuit Court commented in 
United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224 (4th 
Cir. 1982). with reference to yery similar 
evidence: 
At the outset, we must recall that the ap-
praisal of the probative and prejudicial 
value of evidence under Rule 403 is entrusted 
to the sound discretion of the trial judge; 
absent extraordinary circumstances. The Court 
of Appeal will not intervene in its resolu-
tion, [citations omitted] (emphasis added) 
The trial court exhibited a reasonable con-
cern that the tendency to confuse the issues 
or mislead the jury outweighed the probative 
value of such evidence. 
The statement of the trial judge in ruling on that 
evidence is indicative of that kind of concern and considera-
tion of the issues (R.2104:18-25. 2105:l-lt). 
Appellant's supposition that Wheeler had a strong 
motive to lie about how long he had been stopped ignores the 
fact that if he was guilty of driving time violations, he 
would have had a stronger motivation to suggest that he had 
been stopped for a longer period of time so as to minimize his 
on-road time. The inference suggested by 
not borne out by the facts. 
appellant is simply 
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POINT IV 
Wheeler's Lawyer Was Not Permitted to Mis-
state The Law During Closing Argument. 
The statement complained of was a comment adopted 
from plaintiff's counsel's own argument on the improbability 
of the precise occurrence (R.1952:11-16). 
Plaintiff claims that the only explanation for the 
jury's verdict was a misstatement of the law. Plaintiff cited 
the case of Halford v. Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400 (1977) to say 
"The terse misstatement could have been tersely corrected." 
Id. at 412. 
Throughout closing argument. plaintiff's counsel 
objected. Three times the judge admonished the jury: 
The Jury is instructed that testimony or 
statements of counsel is not evidence. You've 
heard the evidence, you'll determine what it 
is. 
(R.1914:10-12) 
The Jury will read the Instructions and be 
bound by them, and statements of counsel are 
not evidence, ladies and gentlemen. 
(R.1919:14-16) 
The jury is directed to look at the Instruc-
tions. They set forth the law in that 
regard. Statement of counsel is to be 
disregarded except as it is accurate. 
(R.1927:5-8) 
If anything, plaintiff's repetitive objections and 
the court's three admonishments negate any claim that the jury 
was misled by any inconseguential remark. It should further 
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be noted that the Court had carefully rea4 the instructions to 
the jury, with deliberateness and cautioi}. and had also pro-
vided written instructions. 
The emphasis given to the clain^  of misstatement by 
plaintiff's objections during closing argument, and the admon-
itions given by the court, might well be construed as detri-
mental to the defendants1 case by putting undue emphasis on 
the fact that statements of counsel should not be considered 
as statements of the law. thus implying that such statements 
were not proper statements. 
Plaintiff also cites State v. Shickles. 
P.2d . 85 UAR 3 (1988). That case dealt with a prosecu-
tor who. in closing argument, stated that the accused if found 
not guilty by reason of insanity would uw4lk[] out the door." 
An objection was made. The prosecutor m^ l^ e another erroneous 
statement: n[T]his Court loses jurisdiction...." Id. at 6. 
The prosecutor withdrew his statement, but it was unclear 
which statement he was withdrawing. Thfe defendant in that 
case did not request a curative instruction, but the Utah 
Supreme Court states that it might have h^lDed avoid difficul-
ty. Id. at 7. 
Plaintiff's counsel in this case failed to inform the 
Court of the difficulty the Missouri couift had in Halford v. 
Yandell. supra, with this question. Tha^: court cited nearly 
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two columns of cases ruling the different ways under different 
fact circumstances, i.e.: 
In other cases no reversible terror was found 
although the trial court made no express 
ruling but told the jury to following the 
instructions: Manlev v. Horton. 414 S.W.2d 
254. 259[7] (Mo. 1967); Hampy v. Midwest 
Hanger Co.. 355 S.W.2d 415. 420[6] (Mo. App. 
1962); State v. Morant, 271 S.W.2d 230. 
232[3. 4] (Mo. App. 1954); Forsythe v. Rail-
way Express Agency. 125 S.W.2d 539. 542[4] 
(Mo. App. 1939); Best v. Liverpool & 
London & Globe Ins. Co.. 49 S.W.2d 230 232[7] 
(Mo. App. 1932); Helfrick v. Taylor. 440 
S.W.2d 940. 946[9-ll] (Mo. 1969). etc. 
id., at 411. 
Defendants maintain the statements of defense counsel 
were fair commentary on the evidence and the instructions, and 
in any event did not prejudice the plaintiff's case. 
POINT V 
The Statements of Defense Counsel During 
Closing Argument Were Neither Improper Nor 
Prejudicial. 
In his amended complaint (R.103-106). plaintiff sued 
defendants for medical expenses and lost wages, both past and 
future, and general damages in the amount of $10,000,000. 
Plaintiff further placed into evidence testimony and exhibits 
claiming special damages in an amount exceeding $3,000,000. 
The complaint asked for a judgment for the damage amounts 
against the defendants. The amounts claimed in the complaint 
and in the trial evidence far exceeded any amount of insurance 
that the defendants might have. 
-36-
In giving Instruction No. 28. the court stated: 
Therefore, if you find that the negligence of 
Wheeler was a proximate cause of plaintiff's 
injuries, then both F&R Roe and Albina are 
automatically responsible for any damages you 
award. (From Plaintiff's Reguested Instruc-
tion #18. R.1623) 
The closing part of Instruction No. 38 reads: 
If you find that defendant Stanley Wheeler 
was negligent. and such negligence was a 
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, the 
plaintiff is entitled to collect the entire 
amount of damage you assess in this case from 
the defendants. 
That instruction was framed so that the jury would 
know that under joint and several liability, which the court 
had already ruled was applicable, the plaintiff would be en-
titled to collect the entire amount of any award from the 
defendants. 
That instruction should also be viewed in connection 
with Instruction No. 29. given at plaintiff's reguest. that 
even though plaintiff's father was driving the car in which 
plaintiff was injured, the law permitted the plaintiff to sue 
only Wheeler and his employers. 
The fact that all or part of any judgment might be 
paid by the defendants through their insurance contracts does 
not minimize the fact that the judgment would be entered 
against the defendants. The argument of defense counsel was 
not inappropriate. and merely reiterated the instructions 
given by the court. 
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As pointed out in Harmon v. Sprouse Reitz Co., 445 
P.2d 773, 21 Utah 2d 361 (1968). counsel should be permitted 
to read instructions and argue their applicability to the 
facts or lack thereof. The statement by defense counsel was 
in keeping with that ruling and the further statement in that 
case: 
We do state a caveat: that if a trial court 
unreasonably prevents counsel from reading 
and commenting on instructions, it would be 
prejudicial error. 
Id. at 363. 
Appellant's citation to Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah 2d 
55 (1962), is inapplicable, since the issue in that case was 
directed toward whether insurance existed. It was held that 
an inadvertent mention of the word "insurance" by both sides 
was not prejudicial. 
In fact, earlier in this case plaintiff's counsel 
interrogated Wheeler and elicited an answer concerning an 
insurance investigator: 
Q: What is that yellow piece of paper you 
read? 
A: I believe that was the statement that I 
gave to the insurance man the day following. 
(R.2074:3-5) 
Thus, the potential prejudicial injection of insur-
ance into the matter was brought out by plaintiff's counsel. 
The Court's attention is also drawn to the case of 
Robinson v. Hreinson. 409 P.2d 121, 17 Utah 2d 261 (1965), at 
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264, wherein the court admonished courts and counsel to pre-
vent the introduction of the subject of insurance into a trial. 
The citation to Priel v. R.E.D., Inc., 392 N.W.2d 65 
(N.D. 1986) is distinguisable because defense counsel said in 
closing argument, "We are talking about money that my client 
will have to pay out of his own pocket". (emphasis added) The 
statement Mpay out of his own pocket" was the objectionable 
portion of that argument and was not present in the instant 
case. 
The citation to Tomeo v. Northern Valley Swim Club, 
493 A.2d 544 (N.J.Super.A.D. 1985) is also inapplicable. 
There counsel said 
[W]hen someone comes up to anyone and says, 
"I've been insured and I want you [sic] 
money. I want your possessions. I want to 
take your house," they must back up the alle-
gations to establish that. 
id- at 545. 
The statement falsely implied that defendant would 
face financial ruin in the event of an adverse verdict. That 
is not the circumstance now before the Court. 
For plaintiff to suggest that defense counsel implied 
that there was no insurance is just not borne out by the 
record, nor is it possible that the jury was misled into be-
lieving that two trucking firms, also defendants, were unin-
sured. 
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The Court's attention is called to Jones v. Carvell, 
641 P.2d 105 (Utah, 1982). The Supreme Court said: 
In this case, defendant did not take the 
stand, and references to the sorrow of the 
defendant and the distress he himself suf-
fered in causing the death of a child viola-
ted the bounds of proper argument, and that 
impropriety was compounded by defendant's 
having admitted the plaintiff's allegations 
of willful intoxication or willfulness so as 
to prevent such evidence from reaching the 
jury. Had the jury been permitted to hear 
the evidence of liability, it may have total-
ly discounted defendant's self-inflicted 
sorrow. Although the argument was improper, 
we do not think that it affected the funda-
mental fairness of the trial, and reversal is 
not, therefore, called for because we do not 
believe a different result would have oc-
curred, (emphasis added) 
The statements of counsel in this case were fair 
comment on the case and were not prejudicial. 
POINT VI 
There Is No Basis for a Claim to Allow Plain-
tiff to Amend to Claim Punitive Damages. 
Plaintiff filed a pretrial motion to amend his com-
plaint to add a claim for punitive damages. (R.1325-1339) 
Plaintiff's claim was that Wheeler had falsified driver's logs 
in reckless disregard for public safety. The testimony upon 
which the plaintiff relied to produce a claim of reckless 
disregard for public safety was that of Mr. Hewitt, whose 
affidavit was attached to the motion to amend. 
After hearing full testimony from Mr. Hewitt, the 
court concluded that his testimony was without adeguate foun-
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dation and was irrelevant, and granted defendants1 motion in 
limine. Thus, even if amendment had been allowed, the evi-
dence would not have gone to the jury. 
The matter of amendments to pleadings is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. In Girard v. Appleby. 
660 P.2d 245 (1983). the court said: 
In any event, the granting of leave to amend 
is a matter which lies within the broad dis-
cretion of the court, and its rulings are not 
to be disturbed in the absence of showing of 
an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice 
to the complaining party. 
Id., at 248 
See also Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455 
(1983) at page 464. and Kelly v. Utah Power & Light. 746 P.2d 
1189 (1987) at page 90, and Tripp v. Vaughn. 746 P. 794 at 
page 797 (1987). 
In any event, amendment to the pleadings to include a 
claim for punitive damages is unnecessary, as pointed out in 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., fe75 P.2d 1179 (1983). 
where at page 1182 the court said: 
Thus, if the plaintiff were able to adduce 
the necessary foundational evidence at trial, 
she could claim punitive damages under Rule 
54(c) without a formal amendment to the 
pleadings. [citing authority ijm support of 
that determination.] 
Thus, if plaintiff had been able to lay the founda-
tion for the issue of punitive damages, it would have been 
unnecessary to plead punitive damages ih order to have the 
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matter submitted to the jury. In this case, the plaintiff 
could not establish a foundation to admit the evidence at all. 
POINT VII 
The Trial Court Did Not Err in its Instruc-
tion on Wheeler's Duty to Set Out Flares or 
V Triangles. 
Instruction No. 24 is almost verbatim the instruction 
requested by plaintiff, and it correctly stated Wheeler's duty 
under federal regulations to place emergency devices "as soon 
as possible" after stopping on the shoulder, "but in any 
event, within ten minutes." 
Appellant would have this Court believe that 49 CFR 
322.22(b) leaves nothing to the jury to determine. Of neces-
sity the phrase "as soon as possible" requires the jury to 
determine whether it was possible or not in this case. 
At plaintiff's request, and despite the fact that the 
court had already directed a verdict of negligence for parking 
beside the highway, the court gave the jury an instruction 
regarding the placement of flares and triangles. The jury 
could not have determined whether Wheeler was further negli-
gent for failure to put out the warning devices without an 
evaluation of whether or not he should have put them out. 
The regulation that flares should be placed "as soon 
as possible, but in any event within ten minutes" inherently 
implies that it may not be possible to place flares if to do 
so would take longer than the time a vehicle is stopped. 
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Wheeler's testimony was that he was stuped no longer than 
three minutes. Under questioning by plajintiff's counsel, he 
also stated that he did not place warning devices, because to 
do so would take longer than the period he would be stopped. 
(R.2158:7-9) The regulation does not contemplate that warning 
devices must be placed on all short stops, or it would not put 
an outside limit of ten minutes for placing them. Under the 
circumstances of this case, the jury could well conclude that 
it was not possible to place flares. 
Testimony showed that Wheeler h£d complied with the 
regulation on placement of warning devides. The instruction 
was not inconsistent with or contradictory to defendant's 
duty, but did express that duty. The instruction on flares 
and triangles was a proper one. 
POINT VIII 
The Trial Court Conducted a Sufficient and 
Thorough Voir Dire Examination o^ Prospective 
Jurors. 
Plaintiff asserts that his cas|e was prejudiced by 
voir dire examination of the jurors insluf f icient to uncover 
bias pertaining to tort reform publicity As stated in State 
v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439: 
It follows that whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in conducting voir dire 
turns on whether, considering th^ totality of 
the questioning. counsel was j afforded an 
adequate opportunity to gain th£ information 
necessary to valuate jurors. 
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On appeal, an appellant has the burden of 
establishing that reversible error resulted 
from an abuse of discretion. (emphasis added) 
Id. at 448. 
An examination of the conference held in chambers on 
the voir dire requested by plaintiff (R. 1987-1995) and of the 
voir dire examination itself (R. ) 
shows that the court conducted an in-depth, careful, and thor-
ough examination to allow all relevant issues to be examined. 
Plaintiff claims he submitted a letter sent by 
Wheeler's insurer. Farmers Insurance, to all its Utah insureds 
several days before trial (R.1271). In fact, an examination 
of that document shows that it was not a letter at all. but a 
page from the magazine Friendly Exchange published by Farmers 
Insurance Group. 
The jurors were all questioned as to the magazines 
that they had in their homes. The court's discussion in the 
voir dire conference indicated that if jurors were subscribers 
to an insurance journal, or some such magazine, that it could 
be pursued further (R.1987:7-17). In this case, by the use of 
that question on magazines, counsel secured additional infor-
mation which otherwise would have been improper. 
In Hornsby v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop. 758 P.2d 
929 (Utah App. 1988). the Court said that 
Whenever a religious organization is a party 
to the litigation, voir dire regarding the 
jury panel's religious affiliations is proper. 
933. 
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It would have been improper in this case to have 
asked the religious affiliations of the jurors, since no 
church was a party. However, when asked about their maga-
zines, the most common responses were Reader's Digest. Nation-
al Geographic, and the LDS magazines. [Thus, by this device 
plaintiff was able to determine which jurors were members of 
the LDS Church. 
In his opening statement (R.2054:17-23) and in testi-
mony by the plaintiff (R.2718:10-20), counsel indicated that 
the plaintiff had received a call to serve an LDS mission 
prior to the accident, and was then waiting to go. The maga-
zine question thus served to enable plaintiff to select a jury 
sympathetic to plaintiff's frustration in not being able to 
fulfill that mission. 
In plaintiff's memorandum in support of his proposed 
voir dire questions regarding the insurance crisis, the arti-
cles attached to that memorandum (R.1249) which plaintiff's 
counsel described as indicative of an alleged "media blitz" 
were articles published in the Deseret News and Salt Lake 
Tribune and Newsweek. All had been published more than a year 
and half prior to trial. He further alludes to an article 
entitled "Craziness in the Courtrooms" from the Reader's Di-
gest, but does not designate when that article was published. 
He further refers to an article (R.1271) and acknowledges that 
that article came from Friendly Exchange, a magazine sent by 
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Farmers Insurance to its insureds. Thus, the relevance of the 
question on magazines and the answers of the prospective 
jurors, none of whom indicated that they received Friendly 
Exchange. 
As indicated in Maltby v. Cox Const. Co.. Inc.. 598 
P.2d 336 at page 341. without the date of publication, the 
court could not determine whether proximity in time might 
necessitate further inquiry. At voir dire in this case, after 
each juror had answered as to his magazines, plaintiff did not 
request further examination of those who answered that they 
subscribed to Reader's Digest to find out if their reading 
might bias them or if they had read the "Craziness" article. 
Plaintiff's requested voir dire questions No. 9. 10. 
22. 23. 32(e). 34. 35. 36 and 37 were all objected to by de-
fendants and not given by the court because of their injection 
into the lawsuit of the issue of insurance. As pointed out in 
Tias. supra. 
These questions particularly as they raise 
the issue of insurance are and were properly 
refused as this Court has previously indi-
cated: 
The question of insurance is immaterial and 
should not be injected into the trial; and 
it is the duty of both counsel and the court 
to guard against it. 
id., at 440. 
The problem with plaintiff's questions on tort reform 
publicity and the articles presented to the court is that in 
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order to ask jurors questions about tt^ eir reading of such 
articles, the questions will necessarily jtaint the jurors. In 
a procedure intended to find fair and impartial jurors, plain-
tiff would ask questions pertaining to) publicity allegedly 
crisis to the atten-
it. By such disclo-
creating bias, bringing awareness of the 
tion of jurors not previously aware of 
sure, the questions make the jurors "tainted" and unavailable 
for service. 
The problem with asking question^ about the insurance 
crisis and tort reform is that the issuG of insurance is in-
jected into the case. If such questioning were permitted, 
jurors would also be informed when thdre is no insurance. 
Also, in cases where there is no insurance, could you bring 
out knowledge of assets, or lack thereof, for satisfying the 
judgment. Once the issue has gone that ftar. then certainly it 
would be urged to disclose to the jury when the amount of 
insurance is inadequate for the claimed recovery, as in the 
i 
case at bar. Inadequate assets would be cj further issue. 
The propriety of the prohibition under Rule 411 of 
injecting into the case any mention of jinsurance is that it 
opens a Pandora's box to a never-ending pursuit violating 
numerous other rules on admissibility I of evidence as to 
assets, how a judgment might be paid, and whether or not the 
defendants themselves are without assets. 
The thrust of the questions urged by appellant, ques-
-47-
tions 24-31, 33, 36, 32(e) 34, 35, and 37, could hardly be 
expected to do other than alert the jury to a prohibited area 
of the existence of insurance. 
The argument that if insurance, under Rule 411, may 
be mentioned in order to show bias and prejudice of a witness, 
then it certainly should be allowed in the voir dire examina-
tion of prospective jurors, ignores the fact that in each case 
as pronounced by the Utah Supreme Court, the discretion of the 
judge is not to be lightly interfered with. The judge who is 
at hand and viewing the context and the flavor of the case is 
better able to determine whether the questions requested are 
going to be prejudicial or helpful in seating a fair and im-
partial jury. 
One of the cases relied upon by appellant is a Mon-
tana case, Borkoski v. Yost, 594 P.2d 688 (1979). But even in 
that case, the court said: 
[A]s a prelude to any questions concerning 
whether a potential juror has read or heard 
anything to indicate that jury verdicts for 
plaintiffs in personal injury cases result in 
higher insurance premiums for everyone, an 
attorney must ask certain general introduc-
tory questions. 
The court pointed out what those preliminary ques-
tions were, and went on: 
If, however, no positive responses are re-
ceived to these introductory inquiries, there 
is no reason to pursue further the line of 
inquiry we have approved above. 
Id. at 695. 
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was in keeping with 
In this case, the court asked those preliminary ques-
tions and indicated in the voir dire conference (R.1988:14-16. 
1993:14-18) and the interrogation (R. ). that he 
would pursue the matter or would not. depending upon the 
jurors' response. 
Plaintiff's proposed voir dire question No. 13 was 
not couched in terms that would determine if the jury was fair 
and impartial. It was intended to fix the idea in the minds 
of the jury that it was a $3,000,000 casej. As such, it was an 
objectionable question. The court asked whether jurors would 
be willing to award, if the evidence scj proved, a "substan-
tial" verdict. Certainly that question 
the correct discretion the court shouljd exercise in these 
matters. 
With the exception of the insurance questions, coun-
sel was invited to submit any additional (questions of a proba-
tive nature to the inquiries counsel needed in order to exer-
cise preemptory challenges at the conclusion of the court's 
examination. Counsel did offer additional questions, and the 
record shows that, with the exception of the specific insur-
ance questions and improper publicity Questions, the court 
allowed all questions counsel were desjirous of asking, in 
keeping with State v. Worthen. 89 Utah Adv. Rep. 21. 
P.2d (1988). It is the respondents1 position that the 
trial court exactly followed the parameters described in the 
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supplemented case of Hornsby. supra. See also Jenkins v. 
Parrish. 627 P.2d 533 (1981). and Saltas v. Afflect. et al. 99 
Utah 381. 105 P.2d 176. wherein the Court said: 
Due consideration should be given to the 
trial judge's somewhat advantaged position in 
determining which persons would be fair and 
impartial [citations omitted], and his deter-
mination should not be disturbed unless he 
abuses his discretion. 
Jenkins, at 53 6. 
POINT IX 
The Trial Court Correctly Excluded Ostler's 
Videotape Demonstration. 
Plaintiff filed a motion in limine to allow the 
showing of the videotape demonstration (R.908-915). Defen-
dants filed a memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's motion 
(R.968-983). 
Hearing on that motion was held by the court, and the 
argument is set forth in the abstract of the transcript of the 
hearing of October 23. 1987 (R. ). Counsel indi-
cated that they attempted to recreate the accident as if the 
truck had not been there. The court questioned what might 
have been had the facts not been as they were and the truck 
not there. Nevertheless the court viewed the videotape demon-
stration (R. ). Plaintiff supplemented his memoran-
dum with the affidavit of Val Shupe. who had already been 
deposed, and counsel pointed out to the court that Mr. Shupe 
indicated that one of three or four different scenarios might 
have happened in the absence of the truc)^. and that there was 
no way he could tell which of those Scenarios might have 
transpired. (R.7:13-25. 8:1-25. 9:1-25. 10:1-9). The court 
in its ruling indicated the reason why ttie evidence was inad-
missible when he said 
do. really, 
s case. It 
jcying to de-
It appears to me. Mr. DeBry. y<}u are trying 
to get something into this case that is so 
speculative that has nothing to! 
with what has happened in thi] 
isn't reconstruction, this is t 
termine in some way what might possibly have 
happened. I can see no valid reason for 
permitting you to do it. I'm going to deny 
your motion to view the video a^ nd grant the 
motion in limine to eliminate it. 
(R.ll:6- ) 
In the presentation and argument\ and in the memoranda 
filed, the defense showed that the difference between the 
so-called recreation and the facts of th4 case were multiple, 
including the age and skill of the demonstrator (the demon-
strator being a stunt driver), the vehicle involved, the stunt 
driver's knowledge of the impending occurrence, whereas the 
decedent driver obviously did not see what was ahead of him or 
he would not have run into the truck, the fatigue was not the 
same, the steering was speculative because the demonstration 
showed that the stunt driver had both hajnds on the wheel and 
steered after he went into the barrow pit. the demonstration 
having been taped in daylight instead o^ the middle of the 
night, the braking that was carried out 
driver was conjectural, the other vehicl) 
by the demonstration 
es in the area were 
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not as had been the case at the time of the accident, the 
angle of leaving the road, the speed which was assumed but not 
demonstrated, and the erratic driving of the driver just prior 
to impact. There were so many discrepancies that the 
so-called demonstration was not applicable, as is borne out by 
the affidavit of Newell Knight (R.977-979). 
As stated in Fisher v. Trapp, supra. 
The trial court's determination of the 
adequate foundation is solely within the 
discretion of the trial court. Tias v. 
Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, 490 (1979) 
wherein the court also quoted from Edwards, supra: 
[T]he admissibility of accident reconstruc-
tion evidence depends in large measure upon 
the foundation laid. The expertise of the 
witness, his degree of familiarity with the 
necessary facts, and the logical nexus be-
tween his opinion and the facts adduced must 
be established. 
In this case, the court denied the admission of the 
videotape because the foundation attempted to be laid did not 
show that the demonstration video had adequate comparable 
factors to make it a recreation but only a demonstration of a 
possible circumstance that could have happened if the truck 
was not there, and not a recreation of what did happen. 
It was properly excluded by the court. 
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POINT X 
The Courts Instruction on Independent Inter-
vening Cause Was Correct. 
Appellant takes issue with Instructions No. 25 and 27 
given by the court and cites to the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts and his characterization that the instructions did not 
correctly reflect the state of the law in regard to supersed-
ing or intervening proximate cause. In Watters v. Querry 
(Watters II), 626 P.2d 455 (1981). a re^rend collision case, 
the court held that foreseeability of the second actor's act 
is an issue that must be resolved by the finder of the fact 
and held that 
In finding that defendant's negligence was 
not a proximate cause of plaintiff's injur-
ies, the jury necessarily concluded that the 
degree of Querry's inattentiveness in this 
case was not foreseeable. 
Id. at 458. 
Therefore, the later negligent act became the sole 
proximate cause of the collision. That is a close parallel to 
the determination made by the jury in this case. 
The court in Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, supra. 
a 1983 case, stated: 
The law of superseding causation is. as a 
general proposition, more easily stated than 
applied. A person's negligence is not super-
seded by the negligence of another if the 
subsequent negligence of another is foresee-
able. 
Id. at 219. 
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The Court then cited its earlier decision adopting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts 447# pertaining to the issue of 
superseding or intervening cause. The Court held in that case 
that the instructions given by the court were erroneous be-
cause they did not submit the proximate cause issue to the 
jury for determination. In the case of Godesky, supra, the 
Court referred back to its decision in Watters II, supra, and 
reiterated that it is correct that a more recent negligent act 
may break the chain of causation and relieve the liability of 
the prior negligent actor under the proper circumstances, and 
that proximate causation is a matter of fact to be determined 
by the jury. 
The Court went on to discuss that the instructions 
given in the Godesky case encompassed the Court's previous 
concepts on proximate cause and intervening or superseding 
proximate cause. 
In 1985, in Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises. 697 P.2d 
240 (Utah), the Supreme Court reiterated as follows: 
The standard definition of proximate cause is 
"that cause which, in natural and continuous 
sequence, (unbroken by an efficient interven-
ing cause), produces the injury and without 
which the result would not have occurred. It 
is the efficient cause -- the one that neces-
sarily sets in operation the factors that 
accomplish the injury." 
It was plaintiffs1 burden to show that defen-
dants1 conduct was a substantial causative 
factor that led to Mitchell's death. 
Id. at 245. 246. 
-54-
Again in 1985. in Williams v. \ Melby. 699 P.2d 723 
(Utah 1985), the Court laid out the elements for a negligent 
action in headnote 3 at page 726. At tjeadnote 9, page 728, 
the Court said: 
The issue of what constitutes h superseding 
cause can not be determined by tjhe simplistic 
formula that the cause which occurs last in 
time is, as a matter of law, a superseding 
cause. Indeed, conduct may be negligent 
simply because subsequent negligent conduct 
by another is foreseeable. 
The Court in that case said further: 
The law of superseding causation is, as a 
general proposition, more easilt stated than 
applied. A person's negligence lis not super-
seded by the negligence of another if the 
subsequent negligence of another is foresee-
able. 
Id., at 729. 
See also Bennion v. LeGrand Jotjnson Const. Co., 701 
P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985). Massey v. Utah Po^er & Light, 609 P.2d 
937 (1980), Reese v. Alberbertsens, 5^7 P.2d 130 (1978). 
Pauley v. Zarbock, 504 P.2d 999, 29 Utah 2d 30 (1972), Skol-
lingsberg v. Brookover, 26 Utah 2d 45, ^84 P.2d 1180 (1971), 
Larsen v. Johnson. 440 P.2d 886. 21 Utah 2d (1968). Hall v. 
Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 161. 417 P.2d 664 (1966). 
Thus, the instruction to be giyen by a trial court 
has to be designed to explain to the jury these elements 
In Instruction No. 25 (R.1671-1672) and Instruction 
No. 27 (R.1675-1676) . the trial court inc| orporated the princi-
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pies and decisions set forth in the five decisions above 
quoted in a manner to explain both the interrelationship of 
foreseeability, proximate cause, and superseding cause. 
In Instruction No. 25, Addendum, the court correctly 
defined proximate cause and that the law does not necessarily 
recognize only one proximate cause, that the acts and omis-
sions of two can combine to concurrently cause an injury, and 
that negligence must be of substantial material fact to bring 
about the harm in order to constitute proximate cause. 
In Instruction No. 27, Addendum, the court also de-
fined that if the second cause was reasonably foreseeable, 
then the first person's conduct would still constitute proxi-
mate cause, or if the likelihood of the occurrence of the same 
general nature, was foreseeable, then it would not exonerate 
the initial negligent acts of Stanley Wheeler in parking the 
vehicle on the shoulder of the highway. 
The combined analysis of Watters II, Harris v. Utah 
Transit Authority, Godesky v. Provo City Corp., Mitchell v. 
Pearson Enterprises, and Williams v. Melby, supra, all demon-
strate that the trial judge in this matter made a careful and 
insightful submission of the instructions on foreseeability, 
proximate cause, and superseding or intervening cause, in 
compliance with the mandates of the Utah Supreme Court. The 
instructions were not in error. As stated in Watters II, 
Once the jury has looked at the facts, 
weighed them, made its decision based upon 
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substantial, competent evidence, we are pre-
cluded from disturbing its findings. 
Id- at 458. 
This Court should rule that t^ ie instructions were 
properly given on the issue. 
POINT XI 
The Court Correctly Denied Plaintiff's Motion 
for a Directed Verdict Against Wheeler on 
Causation. 
Both prior to and during the course of the trial of 
this matter, plaintiff moved the court for a directed verdict 
on the issue of causation against the defendant Wheeler. In 
the second day of trial, the court granted the motion for a 
directed verdict on the issue of the negligence of Wheeler, 
but reserved for trial the issue of proximate cause (R.2104-
2106) and instructed the jury during the course of the trial 
that he had ruled that the parking of ttie vehicle was negli-
gence as a matter of law. He reserved fpr trial the issue of 
proximate cause. 
The court gave Instruction No. 23 (R.1669) in which 
he directed negligence as a matter of law against Wheeler. 
In urging this Court that the trial court committed 
error in not ruling on causation as a matter of law. plaintiff 
ignores the cases cited under Point IX above, and numerous 
other cases handed down by the Utah Supreme Court and the 
Court of Appeals holding that the matters of causation are 
almost universally issues of fact to be decided by the jury. 
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Only in the most extreme circumstances, where reasonable minds 
could not differ, would the issue of causation be taken from 
the jury. 
Plaintiff cites no Utah cases in support of his posi-
tion that the court should have ruled on causation as a matter 
of law, and ignores the literally dozens of cases holding that 
causation is almost always an issue of fact for the jury. 
On the issue of a directed verdict, the Court is 
cited to White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 1297 (1983), wherein, on the 
issue of a directed verdict, the Court said "Evidence is 
viewed in a light most favorable to the party moved against.11 
In this case, the denial of the directed verdict on 
causation must be viewed in a light most favorable to the 
party moved against, namely defendant Wheeler, and the deci-
sion of the trial judge to submit the matter to the jury is in 
keeping with the numerous cases cited throughout this brief, 
and many others too numerous to itemize. 
On the issue of the denial of the motion for directed 
verdict on causation, the Courtfs attention is also drawn to 
Penrod v. Carter, 737 P.2d 199 (1987), wherein the Court said: 
A motion for a directed verdict requires the 
trial court to consider evidence in the light 
most favorable to the party against whom it 
is directed. The case should not be taken 
from the jury where there is substantial 
dispute in the evidence. 
In this case there was substantial dispute in the 
evidence, for under the instruction given, all the driver of 
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which the jury con-
the plaintiff's vehicle had to do was coknply with Instruction 
No. 22 (R.1668); that is, not remove his car from the lane of 
traffic until it was safe to do so, and there would have been 
no accident. That is the premise upon 
eluded that the parking of the truck was not the proximate 
cause of the accident, but that the driving from the lane of 
traffic by the later actor was the sole proximate cause of the 
accident. 
If the reasoning of plaintiff were adopted here, 
there would be no justification for the analysis or reasoning 
set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 447, to which 
plaintiff has alluded, having a definition of superseding 
cause. His analysis would make a determination of negligence 
merge with a causation such that negligence would always be 
causation. If the analysis and reasoning of plaintiff in this 
regard were adopted, then the Supreme Court, in the five lead-
ing cases chronicled in Point IX above. Would be unnecessary. 
I 
By plaintiff's analysis, in all cases of combined negligence, 
there would be concurrent negligence and there would be no 
such thing as superseding negligence. The definition on 
superseding or intervening negligence as an intervening sole 
proximate cause would be a definition without purpose. 
The court submission of the issije of proximate cause 
to the jury, and of the issue of intervening or superseding 
cause, was in compliance with the mandates of the Utah Supreme 
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Court decisions and was a correct submission of the case. 
When plaintiff argues that reasonable minds could not 
differ on the negligence of Wheeler being the cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries, he concludes that none of the jurors, 
who entered a unanimous verdict in this case after five days 
of trial, whom he had already approved and passed for cause, 
were reasonable people, since they found unanimously that the 
negligence of Stanley Wheeler was not a proximate cause of the 
injuries of the plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
The pronouncements of the appellate courts of Utah 
have long evidenced their abiding respect for the jury system. 
They have pronounced rules in accordance therewith. The Court 
in Robinson v. Hreinson, supra, said that the jury verdict 
should not be overturned unless it clearly appears that there 
has been abuse of discretion. 
In this case, the trial judge was careful, diligent, 
and circumspect in all of his rulings, which is demonstrated 
by an examination of the record and a recognition of the pa-
tience with which he responded to the various motions made by 
both parties in the action. In Stanqer v. Sentinel Security 
Life Insurance Co., 669 P.2d 1201 (1983), in Von Hake v. Thom-
as, 705 P.2d 766 (1985), in Matter of Kessler, 702 P.2d 86 
(1985), and in Peats v. Commercial Security Bank, 746 P.2d 
1191 (1987), the Court has consistently stated that it will 
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not substitute its judgment for that of a jury. 
As stated in the last cited case 
We review the jury's verdict in the light 
most favorable to the prevailing party, and 
accord the evidence presented a^ id every rea-
sonable inference fairly drawn £rom the evi-
dence the same degree of deference. 
Id. at 1192. 
In this case, plaintiff had a full five-day trial on 
the issues presented, which were fairl^ ruled upon by the 
trial court. After its deliberation, th^ jury concluded that 
plaintiff's injuries were caused by the 
of the accident, determined by the jury 
the vehicle in which plaintiff was riding.| 
This Court should affirm that jury verdict. 
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of October. 1988 
sole proximate cause 
to be the driver of 
M. Day lei 
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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
my analysis is, if you wish to hear it, is that we have cles 
vision in about a five degree cone of vision with each eye, 
although a field of vision is approximately 180 degrees, 
normal two-eyed, you know, person.11 
Q (By Mr. Jeffs) Thank ^ou. That's far enough. 
Specifically, what factors differentiate between being 
asleep and in this low state of,iwhatever you call it, 
arousal or whatever? 
A What factors? 
Q Yes. How do you differentiate between the two? 
A Okay. Closing of the qyes is a, is a clear-cut 
landmark, so to speak. Once the lids close over the eyes, 
then no more visual information i|s coming through. That's 
one landmark. 
Other than that, short of brainwaves, brainwave 
i 
recording, there aren't, aren't many criteria to go on. 
Q And in this case you have no way of determining it 
because the man died, the driver died; you have no way to 
determine brainwaves or asleep or either? 
i 
A Oh. I wouldn't even, evjen if he had survived. 
MR. JEFFS: I think that's all the cross 
l 
examination at this time, your Honpr. 
MR. DEBRY: WeJLl, your Honor, I'm ready 
to argue that, if I could, as to the witness, unless you 
have other questions. May the witiess step down? 
2402, 
9 
10 
1 I Q Let me ask it this way: Do you have an opinion 
2 whether it's, you've trained drivers, you teach drivers, you 
3 teach companies about these things; do you have an opinion 
4 whether it's foreseeable, to a reasonable truck driver, 
5 parked on the paved shoulder, that other errant vehicles will 
6 wander off into that shoulder and perhaps hit him? 
7
 A It should be, sir. It ip a requirement of the 
8 Federal Regulations that, which he is required to know 
before operating, he is required to be aware of it, particu-
larly, the Part 392 which is his part of the Regulations, 
11 that he must not stop in these areas; and that if he does, he 
12 must immediately or as soon as possible place his triangles 
13 out. Does that, I'm sorry, I'm trying to answer. 
14
 Q I think it's okay. As you attend meetings and you 
15 attend seminars and conventions and you teach truckers, 
16 do you hear common talk about when!truckers talk about 
17 people running into the back of them? Is that common talk 
18 among truckers? 
19
 I A That is a common subject 
every seminar, even with bus seminars, for at least since 
1982, and quite occasionally before then. But since 1982 
22 it's been a frequent subject. 
23
 I Q Do you htink there is an^ trucker in The United 
States that doesn't know when he parks at the side of the 
road in a paved shoulder that somebody might run into the 
; 1 
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20 
21 
24 
25 
that comes up at almost 
ADDENDUM NO. 2 
INSTRUCTION NO. £ f 
You will note in a negligence case that in order 
for a party to be entitled to recoverf for injuries caused 
by another's negligence, the party alleging negligence must 
prove not only negligence on the part of the other party, 
but also that such negligence was a proximate cause of such 
injuries. In other words, mere proof of negligence is not 
enough. It must be' shown by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the negligent act, or acts, complained of was, or 
were, a proximate cause of the accident and injuries in 
question in order to establish a right to recover. 
I 
In a negligence case the term "proximate cause11 
relates to the cause of the u«• i i %li• n f i n quufi I ijji Mini 1 h" 
injury or damages resulting therefrorii. The proximate cause 
is that act or failure to act which rjecessarily sets into 
operation factors which, in natural and continuous sequence 
result in the accident and without which the accident would 
not have occurred. Such a cause may be an act of either 
commission or omission, or both. 
The law does not necessarily recognize only one 
proximate cause of an a<^^tei*&4 consisting of only one factor, 
one act, or the conduct or only one person. To the contrary, 
the separate acts or omissions of two or more persons may 
work concurrently as a proximate cause of an injury, and if 
such be the case, the acts or omissions of each such person 
are regarded in law as a proximate cause. However, while 
in an accident case both parties may have been negligent, 
it does not necessarily follow that the negligence of each 
is, in fact, a proximate cause of the accident or injuries 
in question. Whether or not such negligence is such a 
proximate cause is a question of fact for you as a jury to 
determine from all ,of the evidence in the case and the facts 
and circumstances disclosed thereby, guided by the applicable 
principles of law as set forth in these instructions. 
The negligence that is conftnitted must be a sub-
stantial or material factor in bringing about the harm in 
order to constitute a proximate cauqe. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 27 
If an injury arises from tiwo distinct causes, 
consideration then must be given to jthe question whether the 
causal connection between the conduct of the party responsible 
for the first cause and the injury was broken by the inter-
vention of a new, independent cause. 
If so, the person responsible for the first cause 
would not be liable for the injury. If, however, the inter-
vening cause or the likelihood of anj occurrence of the same 
general nature was foreseen or shouljd reasonably have been 
foreseen by the person responsible for the first cause, then 
such personfs conduct would be the ptroximate cause of the 
injury, notwithstanding the intervening cause, and he would 
be liable therefor. 
Thus, if you find the collision of the vehicle 
driven by Stephen Ostler with the trkctor-trailer of Albina 
Transfer Company, Inc., parked on thfe shoulder of the highway, 
or the likelihood of an occurrence op the same general nature, 
was within the natural and continuou^ sequence of events 
which might reasonably be foreseen t\) follow the actions of 
Stanley Wheeler, then you must find that the actions of 
Stanley Wheeler were a concurring proximate cause of the 
collision, even though the later negligent act of Stephen 
Ostler cooperated to cause the •accident. 
But if the actions of Stephen Ostler in causing 
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the collision were of such character as not reasonably to 
be foreseen in the natural and contiguous sequence of 
events started by Stanley Wheeler, then the acts of Steven 
Ostler are the independent intervening cause and, therefore, 
the sole proximate cause of the injury. 
